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HT 'rHE SUPRE11E COUR'C' OF TIIF 
STATE OF UT.\!! 
STATE OF UTZ\H, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 15550 
JAMES M. GRAY, 
Defendant-Aprellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with burglary, a felony of 
the second degree, in violation of § 76-6-202, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Fourth 
Judicial Court of Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson 
presiding, on November 1, 1977. Appellant was found guilty 
and sentenced to serve a term of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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f\Ef,lE"' SmTG!lT 0;1 ll.PPf'\L 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court afEirning 
the judgment of the lower court. 
STATH!ENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of September 18, 1977, at aporoximat 
7:00 p.m. in the evening, appellant and one James Richard 
Butters burglarized a trailer situated on a construction site 
and occupied by one Charles LeHoy Stanley, the superintenderu 
of construction on that site. Mr. Stanley was out of town 
at the time the hurglary occurred. After breaking the windm 
on the door of the trailer and breaking ooen two side 
compartments, appellant and Butters removed several items 
belonging to Mr. Stanley from the premises. 
At the trial, the State called, among others, Kent 
Curtis (Tr. p. 27), an Adult Probation and Parole Officer 
for the State of Utah, who had been with the investigating 
officers at the time appellant was brought in for guestionirr 
and subsequently participated in the search of the motel roa 
where several of the stolen items were recovered. In establ 
foundation for this witness, the prosecutor asked Kent 
Curtis to state his name and his occupation (Tr. p. 27). 
Mr. Curtis then recited his name and stated that he was a 
Probation and Parole Officer for the St~te of Utah (Tr. p. 
-2-
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The nrosecutor then ask-=d '1.m·1 long ';r. Curtis had known 
appellant to which the witness respondent "approximately 
ten years." (Tr. p. 28). '1r. Curtis then proceeded to 
testify about the search macle hv himself and Officers Lance and 
Downard (Tr. p. 28). 
During the cross-examination of State's witness, 
Ronald Ziegler, later in the trial, defense counsel, asked 
Mr. Ziegler how long he had known appellant, to which Mr. 
Ziegler respondent, "about a little over two and ii half years." 
(Tr. 53). A subsequent inquiry was made as to where the witness 
and appellant had first met and Mr. Ziegler replied, "At 
the nrison." (Tr. p. 54). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and appellant 
was sentenced to serve a term of one to fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THAT HIS 
REPRESENTATION BY APPOI:-JTED COU~JSEL 
MET THE REQlIIRED STANDARD OF A 
COMPETE!JT MEMBER OF THE BAR RENDERING 
REASONABLE EFFECTIVE .Z\.SSISTAHCE. 
Several Utah Supreme Court cases hold that when 
an appellant is claiming he has been denied effective 
represenation, the court must look to the record to determine 
-3-
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if arrcllant's contention has ~erit. 
Utah 2d 103, 3ti8 ?.'2c1 914 (1962); State v. Doc'q·.J, 19 Utah 2d 
44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967); and State v. Heath, 27 Utdh 2d 13, 
492 P. 2c1 978 (1972). Justice Crockett surrunari7.ed this 
frequent objection raised by appellants in the recent case o 
State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 (J974) when 
he Si:id: 
"In regard to the defendant's 
contention that he was denied effective 
counsel: we are impelled to remark 
that it is nothing less than shameful 
thctt our la''' seems to have degenerated 
to a point where whenever an accused 
is convicted of cri~e, the charge of 
inco~petencv of counsel is, with ever 
increasing frequency, leveled at 
capable attorneys who have given 
entirely adequate service, when the 
real difficulty was that he had a guilty 
client. In this respect also de-
fendant had his entitlement of adequate 
representatio·nby capable and conscientious 
counsel." Id. at 1315 
Nothing in the present record indicates that 
appellant was denied effective counsel. Appellant contends, 
however, that his representation was so ineffective that it 
failed to meet the standard of reasonably effective assistar 
rendered by a competent member of the Bar. Appellan~ bases 
his argument on several aspects of the conduct of the trial, 
concluding that even though any one matter in and of itself 
might not require a reversal, the entire transcriot oresents 
a picture of a completely inadequate defense. This argument 
is not sustained by the record or cases dealing with the iss 
-4-
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~~is Court enunciat0C in Alires v. ~urncr, 22 Utah 
2d 112., 4~,') P.20 241 (196'1), thr:e test to b:- usccd whenever 
the question of ineffective counsel is raised. In Alires, 
the court first stated that the right of an accused to coansel 
is included in the concept of due process of law, embodied 
as it is in the Unitec States and Utah Constitutions. The 
requirement of counsel, said the Court: 
. is not satisfied by a 
sham or pretense of an appearance 
in the record by an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the 
interests of the accused." Id.at 242 
Immediately following the above statement, the court indicated 
the standard required by due orocess to be applied to appointed 
counsel: 
"The entitlement is to the 
assistance of a competent member of 
the Bar, who shows a willin~ness 
to identify himself with the interests 
of the defendant and present such 
defenses as are available to him 
under the law and consistent with 
the ethics of the profession." 
Id. at 121. 
This standard has been consistently reaffir~ed by 
the Utah Supreme Court. See Johnsonv. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 
439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970); Kryger v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214, 
479 P. 2c1 477 (1971); State v. McNicol, 55~ P. 2d 203 (Utah 1976). 
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supnort of hi~ ar~,.ument th·1t he r('Cei. 1f".'_'rJ .inr:f'.:r;cti_,_,c us-
sist2nc~ do not establi:::;'.1 u s[l,::_:1rn or 0retens2 nF an et-Jpea1~?1.nct 
by the attorney rei:-i1·esentin<:J hiT1, !'O.C is ther0 any rc,flectior 
in the record of a lack of concern about the interes'c:s of 
appellant. 
Appellant contends that his defense couns~l failed 
to make proper objections to admission of certain evic1ence, 
failed to satisfactorily cross-examine witnesses, fcliled to 
adequately probe possible defenses, and failed to exclude 
witnesses during the trial. All of these matters are often 
a method of trial strategy, individual to each attorney, and 
cannot he said to indicate lack of concern by the attorney ~ 
his client or ineffective representation. See State v. McN~ 
544 P.2d 293 (Utah 1976), where the court concluded that 
failure to object, brief direct examination and failure to 
pursue certain matters fell "within the ambit of an attorney 
legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial tactics or stratE 
and State v. Farni, 112 Ariz. 132, 539 P.2d 889 (1975) where 
the court concluded that failure of defense counsel to cross· 
exanine one witness and question others on certain points wa! 
tactical decision. 
Appellant contends that the trial record, read as 
a whole, reflects a completely inadequate defense requiring 
reversal and a new trial. Appellant states that "[a] reading 
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of e•r( n the• first FE·.1 pages of the transcript demonstrates 
that, for whatever reason, trial counsel was unable to 
cu~municate clearly with either the judge, jury, or witnesses," 
thereby suggesting to the court that it read the trial 
transcript in part or in its entirety. 
Respondent would join in this request to the Court. 
However, respondent submits that the record satisfies the 
standard established in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 
449 P.2d 241 (1969), i.e. of reasonably effective assistance 
rendered by a competent member of the Bar. 
If the court should find that any of the particulars 
raised by appellant herein do not meet the above standard, 
one further inquiry must be made. The court must determine 
whether there.is some basis for believing that a better re-
presentation by counsel would have been advantageous to 
appellant at trial. As the court stated in Alires v. Turner, 
supra: 
"This is so because it is the 
policy of our law established both 
by statute and decision that we do 
not reverse for mere error or 
irregularity, but only where it is 
substantial and prejudicial." Alires v. 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 120. 
The particular matters cited by appellant as 
evidence of ineffective representation by defense counsel 
-7-
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ca!'.not be said, st.:inc1ing nl.Ol'C' or as ·< F'.1ole, to ha,re hn.d 
such an effect upon the result - app2lJ.rnt's con-Jiction of 
burglary - as to requirro a nc\·.' trial. 7\ssuminq for the sake 
of argument that the defense attorney herein failed to make 
proper objections to admission of certain evidence, failed t 
satisfactorily cross-examine witnesses, failed to adequately 
probe defenses, and failed to exclude witnesses during trial 
there is no viable reason to believe that the verdict would 
have been different. 
Appel!ant's allegations of ineffectiveness and 
prejudice are merely speculative and are not a demonstrable 
reality. Therefore, ineffectiveness of counsel is Qerely 
speculative at this point and the burden of proof still 
rests clearly upon appellant. In State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 
203 (Utah 1976), this court stated: 
"A defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the inadequacy or in-
effectiveness of counsel, and proof 
of such must be a demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter." Id. at 204. 
In the instant case, the trial record reflects tha 
appellant was properly represented by counsel so as not to 
impair any of his constitutional rights. Appellant exercise 
the right, through counsel, to confront witnesses against hi 
-8-
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his m;1 lichalr. 
before ci 1ucy. 
ThP record on anneal and the transcript of 
the trial support r'~s~-,ond2nt' s contention that appellant hQrein 
was given legal representation by his appointed counsel which 
satisfies the standard set by the Utah Suprene Court. 
Appellant's defense attorney rendered reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel as a conpetent rciemher of the Bar. Hone 
of the matters cited by appellant in arguing that his re-
presentation was so ineffective as to not meet the standard 
set forth in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 
(1969), either st?nding alone or as a whole, could be said 
to have had such an effect on the verdict as to require a 
reversal. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POHJT II 
REPORTING OF CLOSING ARGUMENT IN TRil\L 
rs !WT CUSTOMARILY DONE UNLESS so 
REQUESTED BY COUNSEL AND FAILURE OF 
COUNSEL TO REQUEST REPORTING OF CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS IS OFTEN A PLANNED STRATEGY 
OH TRIAL TACTIC AND 'l'llEREF'ORE APPELLANT 
lffiS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO 
APPEAL. 
Appellant contends that failure to report 
closing argum~nts has deprived him of his constitutional 
right to appeal. Appellant further contends that the 
essence of the right to appeal is that of review in 
search of error, State v. McLaughlin, 22 Utah 2d 321, 
324, 452 P.2d 75 (1969), and argues that this requires 
a review of the entire proceedings in the low~r court 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7). 
provides: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-2 (1953), as amended, 
"[I)t shall be the duty of the 
shorthand reporter to attend oll 
sessions of the court, and to take 
full stenographic notes of thP-
evidence given and of all proceedings 
had the1:~,in except when the jurlc;e 
dispenses with his services in- ~1-­
partTcuTar cause or with resrec_t_ to 
a portion of the proceedings thereof 
."(Emphasis added.) 
Respondent submits that the wording of the stat 
allows the decision of whether the entire proceedings shi 
be reported to be within the discretion of the judge and 
-10-
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counsel. It is not customarv in Utah for the court 
stenographer to report the closing arguments of 
counsel unless a request is made by counsel to do so 
or the matter is a capital case. See Lane v. State, 
247 So.2d 679 (Ala. 1971), where the court, in 
interpreting a statute similar to our own, determined 
that the statute did not require the court reporter to 
make full stenographic notes of the arguments of counsel. 
The general rule (see 82 C.J.S. § 9 at 1057} 
is that the duties of the court stenographer are 
prescribed by statute and as an official under the 
control of the court, he is subject to its discretion. 
See McCoy v. State, 2 S.W.2d 242 (Texas, 1927). In 
the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision 
to the contrary, and absent a request by one of the 
parties, it is discretionarv with the court whether 
full stenographic notes of the arguments will be taken. 
The duties of the stenographer include attending court, 
being present or within call throughout the entire trial, 
except during the arguments of counsel [see Magoohan v. 
Curra__!"l, 42 A. 656, 71 Conn. 551 (1899), and State v. 
~aum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915)) so that the courts 
and litigants ciln be protected by a complete record. 
-11-
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As appellant contends, an appellate court 
can reverse due to errors committed by counsel dur.ing 
his argument; however, to do so it must have the rc'cord 
of the closing arguments before it on appeal. It is 
well settled that the court on appeal is bound by the 
record as certified and it can only take notice of 
that which is part of the record as certified and 
transmitted. Bradley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d 399 (1939); 
Marv Jane Stevens Co. v. Foley, 248 Pac. 815 (1926). 
During closing argument, counsel makes a 
summation of the evidence previously presented to the 
court and whether or not counsel wishes to have the 
closing arguments reported and therefore part of the 
record, is often a strategy or trial tactic used 
analogous to choosing whether to be tried before a 
judge and jury or a judge alone; whether to testify or 
exercise the constitutional right to remain silent; 
whether to call witnesses to testify on defendant's 
behalf, etc. While an attorney may be criticized 
for his judgment as to those matters, an exercise in 
bad judgment, i.e., a poor choice, is not grounds for 
reversal. 
Although the closing arguments were not 
transcribed, appellant is not without an alternative 
-12-
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Depositions could have been 
taken of the trial attorney and the prosecutor to 
detcn1ine the content of the closing arguments of 
trial and these depositions could have been designated 
as part of the recor~ on appeal. Yet appellant 
contends this failure to report closing arguments 
has deprived him of his constitutional right to an 
appeal of the entire record and in addition to exercising 
his alternative, i.e., obtaining depositions, fails to 
show prejudice or unfairness as a result of this failure 
to report closing arguments in his brief. Furthermore, 
he has failed to establish that failure to record closing 
arguments affected the outcome of the trial, or because 
of comments made during the closing arguments, review on 
appeal. 
Thus, respondent submits that appellant's 
contention is without merit on two grounds: First, as 
a general rule, reporting of closing arguments is not 
custo~arily practiced but is discretionary with the 
judge and counsel; and secondly, the discretionary 
choice to request reporting of closing arguments is 
often used as a strategy or trial tactic of the 
particular attorney in charge of the case. 
-13-
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POINT III 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED AS TO THE OCCUPATION 
OF ONE OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES AND A 
STATEMENT AS TO THE FACT THAT APPELLANT 
HAD BEEN IN PRISON WERE ISOLATED, 
UNHIGHLIGHTED COMMENTS AND NOT PPE,TllDICIAL 
TO APPELL·\NT AND THEREFORE NOT GROUNDS FOR 
REVERSAL ON APPEAL. 
Appellant contends that the introduction of 
evidence revealing that State's witness Kent Curtis 
was an Adult Probation and Parole Office and had known 
the appellant for approximately ten years and the sub-
sequent statement by State's witness Ronald Ziegler on 
cross-examination by then defense attorney Nash that 
he had met appellant in prison were statements received 
as evidence through prosecutorial misconduct ~nd thus 
constitute prejudicial error. 
Respondent submits that appellant's contention 
is both inaccurate and incorrect for the following reason 
First, the comment made by witness Ziegler wa!; heard on 
cross-examination of that witness by the defense attorn~ 
for appellant. Assuming as respondent contends that 
appellant's trial counsel was effective and provided 
reasonably competent representation, it may well be 
that he chose to either discredit the State's witness, 
rather than defendant, by introducing the fact that 
Ziegler had also been in prison or to let tho statement 
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rc~1ain insirJnificant and uncommented upon in order to 
avoid einphetsizin9 the ~wtter before the jury by making 
a motion to strike. If the defense attorney's failure 
to object was purposeful and he was giving competent 
representation as respondent contends, then that action 
constitutes a waiver and bar to raising that issue for 
review on appeal. Watkins v. State, 560 P.2d 921 (Nev. 
1977); State v. French, 531 P.2d 373 (Mont. 1975); 
Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1973). On the 
other hand, if the defense attorney's failure to object 
was not purposeful, then the comment, standing alone, 
was so insignificant as to constitute harmless error. 
See State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547 (Utah 1978). 
In the recent case of United States v. Sigal, 
572 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1978), comments made by a 
prosecutor regarding defendant's failure to testify 
were determined by the court to be harmless error. In 
Sigal, which can be analogous to the comments made in 
this case, the court stated: 
"Here the comment was not 
extensive, there was minimal 
stress .•• and there was 
no substantial evidence which 
supported an acquittal." Id. 
at 1323. 
-15-
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Thus, the comment made by witness Ziegler was but an 
isolated, unhighlighted state~ent and therefore not 
prejudicial to appellant. 
As to appellant's second contention that the 
prosecutor intentionally introduced evidence that the 
Adult Probation and Parole Officer, Kent Curtis, had 
known the appellant for ten years, thus implicating 
that appellant had a prior conviction for a crime and h~ 
been in prison, it is a general rule that a witness may 
be examined about his background, occupation, and the 
like for the purpose of aiding the jury in evaluating 
his testimony and credibility. State v. Brewe~, 549 
P.2d 188 (Ariz. 1976). In the instant case, witness 
Curtis was asked simply to state his name, occupation, 
and how long he had known the defendant. Herc again 
the failure of the defense attorney to object could have 
been trial strategy; perhaps he did not want to stress 
the fact and felt it was unnecessary to object. Assumin 
as respondent contends, that defense counsel was an 
effective attorney, rendering reasonable, competent 
representation, if he failed to voice objection he 
cannot raise the issue for review on appeal. Further, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953), as amended, provides 
that "a witness must answer as to the fact of his previ~ 
-16-
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con vi c ti on of fr:lony," ancl thus tho prosecution had 
the eight, sanctioned by statute, to adduce evidence 
of arpellant's prior felony convictions once appellant 
took the stand; therefore appellant's contention is 
without merit. Also, had the evidence been directly 
introduced rather than as it was, by inference, the 
evidence of prior convictions for burglary could have 
been admitted to show intent, knowledge, or absence of 
mistake or accident. See Rule 55, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and State v. Crowley, 552 P.2d 971 (Kan. 1976). 
In addition, the evidence of prior convictions could have 
been introduced to impeach appellant's credibility once 
he had taken the stand. Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
allows evidence of crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statement to be introduced for purposes of impeaching a 
witness' credibility. In State v. Crowley, 552 P.2d 
971 (Kan. 1976), the court stated: 
"Burglary and larceny are 
crines involving dish=~esty 
and conviction of those offenses 
may be shown for purposes of 
impairing the credibility of a 
witness." Id. at 975. 
Thus, the comments adduced by the prosecutor 
were elicited during fundamental foundation questions 
to the State's witness; they were not emphasized nor 
hiqh l i cih tccl hy further testimony and therefore are not 
[n,·judicial to appellant. 
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Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), the prosecuting 
attorney had inquired as to whether the defendant, on 
trial for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon, had 
used the same gun to perpetrate another robbery. Yet 
even these comments, certainly more serious than those 
made in the instant case, were not enough to reverse 
the conviction. In Hodges, the Court stated: 
" ••• there should be no 
reversal of a conviction merely 
because of error or irregularity, 
but only if it is substantial 
and prejudicial in the sense that 
in its absence there is a reasonable 
likelihood that there would have been 
a different result." (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 1325. 
Respondent contends that the comments complaine 
of by appellant were not objected to at trial by his 
defense attorney, who respondent believes effectively 
represented appellant in a reasonable, competent manner, 
and therefore are not an issue that can be raised on 
appeal. Respond'2rit further contends that the con<lents 
were isolated, unhighlighted comments and thus not 
prejudicial to appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that in 
view of the arguments presented above, appellant's 
conviction of burglary should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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